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ENJOINING URBAN RENEWAL--INADEQUATE RELOCATION FACILITIES: WESTERN ADDITION COMMUNITY
ORGANIZATION V. WEAVER
Urban renewal projects provide for the physical revitalization of a
neighborhood. They also necessitate changes in the housing of the
individuals and families in the about-to-be-renewed neighborhood. In
some cases, there is not enough adequate housing available to fill the
needs of those persons forced to leave the urban renewal area. Focusing on the recent case of Western Addition Community Organizationv.

Weaver,' this note will examine the ability and adequacy of the judiciary
to provide injunctive relief for those persons.
I.

Background

The enabling legislation for the urban renewal program is the
Housing Act of 1949.2 Its stated policy is to "remedy the serious
housing shortage . . . [eliminate] substandard and other inadequate

housing through the clearance of slums and blighted areas, and . . .
[realize] the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment
for every American family. . ...3 The Department of Housing and

Urban Development (HUD), in conjunction with other related departments and agencies of the federal government, is assigned the task of
accomplishing these national objectives. 4 To perform this task, HUD
encourages private enterprise and local public agencies (LPA's)5 to
initiate projects of slum clearance and urban renewal and assists them
by providing financial backing and administrative guidance.' Local
communities desire to initiate these projects for several reasons: anticipated increases in tax revenues, a need to restore the inner city for
economic reasons, aesthetic considerations of the urban environment,
and a need to eliminate slums and blighted areas. 7 Because the federal
government's financial backing makes the urban renewal projects economically attractive, private enterprise readily cooperates with the local
1. 294 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
2. Ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (Supp. m, 1968).
4. Id.
5. For a further discussion of the role of the LPA, see A. VAN HY cK & J.
The Local
HORNuNG, THE CITzIEN's GUIDE TO URBAN RENEWAL 35-42 (1964).
Public Agency (LPA) is the officially designated public body established under the
auspices of the state laws to carry out the responsibility of urban renewal under a
cost-sharing loan and grant of the federal government.
6. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-458 (Supp. 111, 1968).
7. See A. VAN HtrYCK & I. HoRNuTNG, supra note 5, at 17-23.
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public agency in carrying out the projects.'
To ensure that the proposed urban renewal projects actually promote the national objectives of the Housing Act of 1949, HUD has
established certain priorities in considering project applications submitted by the LPA's. HUD has stated that priority will be given to
those project applications that (a) contribute to conserving and increasing the existing housing supply for low- and moderate-income families, (b) contribute to the development of employment opportunities
for jobless, underemployed, and low-income persons through commercial and industrial redevelopment, and (c) contribute to the elimination of critical slum and blighted areas. This last category is defined as "areas of physical decay, high tensions, and great social
need . . .-.
As a result of this combination of community desires and national
goals, the majority of urban renewal projects entail the clearance of
slums and blighted areas. Many of the buildings destroyed in the clearance of these areas provided housing for low-income individuals and
families. Consequently, these persons are displaced during the clearance phase of the project.
Unfortunately, section 105(c) of the Housing Act of 1949 did not
provide relocation services and payments for displaced persons.1 1 In
1956, however, an amendment provided for relocation payments as a
matter of right12 and in 1964, by further amendment, the LPA's were
required to establish relocation services to refer displaced persons to decent housing. 3 At present, section 105(c) of the Housing Act of 1949,
amended and codified in sections 1455(c)(1) and (2) of Title 42 of
the United States Code, requires that each LPA establish a relocation
assistance program to coordinate the needs of the residents with the avail8. The system of economic aid established by the federal government is set out
in 42 U.S.C. § 1452 (1964). This economic aid makes the acquisition of land easier
for the LPA, thereby enabling private enterprise to acquire the land from the LPA in
conjunction with its development plan at a price often far below open market price.
9. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, URBAN RENEWAL
HANDBOOK

RHA 7202.1 (1968)

[hereinafter cited as

HANDBOOK].

10. HANDBOOK RHA 7202.1, ch. 1, sec. 1, at 1.
11. Section 105(c) of the Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413, provided
that "[t]here be a feasible method for the temporary relocation of families displaced
from the project area, and that there are or are being provided, in the project area or
in other areas not generally less desirable in regard to public utilities and public and
commercial facilities and at rents or prices within the financial means of the families
displaced from the project area, decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings equal in number to
the number of and available to such displaced families and reasonably accessible to
their places of employment ....
12. Housing Act of 1956, ch. 1029, § 305, 70 Stat. 1100.
13. Housing Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-560, § 305(b), 78 Stat. 786.
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able housing resources. 4 Further, the LPA must assure HUD within
a reasonable time prior to actual displacement that adequate relocation
facilities do in fact exist. 15 This assurance by the LPA becomes part
of the contract between the federal government and the LPA.' 6
The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development is given a mandate to issue rules and regulations to administer the relocation assistance
program.' 7 HUD regulations require the LPA to assure HUD, as a
part of the LPA's project application, that there will be adequate relocation housing available on a nondiscriminatory basis when the project is
executed.' 8 Although HUD requires the LPA to submit a narrative
description of the available relocation housing supply,' 9 the effectiveness
of this requirement is greatly diminished by HUD's explanation that
[n]o surveys need be undertaken to obtain this information ...
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(1) (Supp. 111, 1968): "(1) There shall be a feasible
method for the temporary relocation of individuals and families displaced from the
urban renewal area, and there are or are being provided, in the urban renewal area or
in other areas not generally less desirable in regard to public utilities and public and
commercial facilities and at rents or prices within the financial means of the individuals
and families displaced from the urban 'renewal area, decent, safe, and sanitary
dwellings equal in number to the number of and available to such displaced individuals
and families and reasonably accessible to their places of employment. The Secretary
shall issue rules and regulations to aid in implementing the requirements of this subsection and in otherwise achieving the objectives of this subchapter. Such rules and
regulations shall require that [the LPA establish] at the earliest practicable time, for
each urban renewal project involving the displacement of individuals, families, and
business concerns occupying property in the urban renewal area, a relocation assistance
program which shall include such measures, facilities, and services as may be necessary
or appropriate in order (A) to determine the needs of such individuals, families, and
business concerns for relocation assistance; (B) to provide information and assistance
to aid in relocation and otherwise minimize the hardships of displacement, including
information as to real estate agencies, brokers, and boards in or near the urban renewal area which deal in residential or business property that might be appropriate for
the relocating of displaced individuals, families, and business concerns; and (C) to assure the necessary coordination of relocation activities with other project activities and
other planned or proposed governmental actions in the community which may affect
the carrying out of the relocation program, particularly planned or proposed low-rent
housing projects to be constructed in or near the urban renewal area."
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(2) (Supp. HI, 1968): "(2) As a condition to further
assistance after August 10, 1965, with respect to each urban renewal project involving
the displacement of individuals and families, the Secretary shall require, within a reasonable time prior to actual displacement, satisfactory assurance by the local public
agency that decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings as required by the first sentence of this
subsection are available for the relocation of each such individual or family."
16. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, § I05(c), 63 Stat. 413, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1455(c) (Supp. III, 1968). All urban renewal projects involve contractual commitments for federal funding in exchange for assurances of adequate relocation facilities
as required by section 1455(c).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(1) (Supp. IH, 1968).
18. HANDBOOK RHA 7212.1, ch. 1, at 1.
19. Id. at 1-2.
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Overall housing resources data can ordinarily be obtained from
the following combination of sources:

Census data

. .

.

city plan-

ning and building departments; LHA [Local Housing Authority];
local real 2estate
board; home builder's association; and utility
0
companies.
As an example of the inadequate way in which this requirement is often
met, a HUD official recently commented on the questionableness of including the availability of hotel rooms in computing available relocation
facilities. 2 '
In addition to the lack of clearly defined criteria for estimating
available relocation facilities, a problem of when to apply the criteria
also exists. Estimations of the adequacy of relocation facilities often
must be done several years prior to actual relocation.2 2 Housing standards change; what was once an acceptable unit often becomes a substandard unit by the time relocation actually begins. This is due to
normal deterioration, new and more rigid housing codes, and the reluctance of the "slumlords" to put substantial investments into repairs
or improvements once they learn, often several years before actual condemnation, that their property will be affected by the urban renewal project. 23 As a result, in many cases there must be a large measure of
guesswork about available relocation facilities until the actual relocation begins.
Furthermore, the political and economic force of the federally
sponsored urban renewal program, in conjunction with the initially weak
legislative provisions for the benefit of the displacee, all too often result
in the mere shifting or fragmenting of the slums or blighted areas.
Instead of achieving the stated national objectives, the urban renewal
projects have effected a decrease in the quality of the physical environment of those displaced. Through the 1950's and into the 1960's,
frequently well over half of those displaced relocated into structurally substandard units. 24 Even when the displacee relocated into
structurally standard units, prohibitive rent increases, some resulting in
a rent constituting as much as 46 percent of the family's net income,
invariably resulted.20
20.

Id. at 2.

21. Western Addition Community Organization v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433, 439
(N.D. Cal. 1968). See also text accompanying note 109 infra.
22. From the beginning of the project until completion, as much as 12 years may
elapse. See M. ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER 73 (1964).
23. See Pozen, Goshen & Bellin, Evaluation of Housing Standards of Families
Within Four Years of Relocation By Urban Renewal, 58 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH

1256 (1968).
24. Hartman, The Housing of Relocation Families,30 J. AM. INSTITUTE OF PLANNERS 266, 270-71, 278 (1964).
25. Id. at 273. "Welfare administrators and others concerned with low-income
family budgets make widespread use of a norm of 20 per cent of income as the maxi-
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The injurious effect of the urban renewal program upon the living
environment of the average displaced person is still another major problem. Most displaced persons are nonwhite; 26 de facto residential segregation has barred their relocation into better neighborhoods, thereby
perpetuating or intensifying segregated living patterns.2
From the above discussion, it is clear that legislative action has
not been sufficient to attain the national goals of the Housing Act of
1949. As previously noted, 28 it was not until 1965 that Congress required the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to demand of
the LPA, within a reasonable time prior to actual displacement, satisfactory assurance that adequate relocation facilities did in fact exist.29
In an attempt to obtain priority in achieving the national goals of the
Housing Act of 1949 rather than mere physical redevelopment, the displacees turned to the judiciary.
II. Western Addition Community Organization v. Weaver
In Western Addition Community Organizationv. Weaver (WACO
1),30 plaintiffs, an unincorporated association of individuals and organizations in the Western Addition A-2 area of San Francisco, California, in August of 1967 filed an administrative protest with Robert
Weaver, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. The basis for
mum that can be spent for housing without cutting into expenditures on other necessities." Frieden, Housing and National Urban Goals: Old Policies and New Realties,
in J. WILSON, THE METROPOLITAN ENIGMA: INQUIRIES INTO THE NATURE AND DIMENSIONS op AMERICA'S "URBAN CuSIS" 148, 152 (1967).
26. Marris, A Report of Urban Renewal in the United States, in L. DUHL, THE
URBAN CONDrrTION 113, 119 (1963).
27. See Green Street Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967) (involving a
complaint of purposeful "Negro removal"); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,
265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (plaintiffs alleged an intentional location of public
housing in ghetto areas).
On the other hand, the slum area often acts as a psychosocial haven into which
the members of its population can retreat from the pressures and demands for adaptation

placed upon them by the community. Fried & Levin, Some Social Functions of the Urban Slum, in B. FRIEDEN & R. MORRIS, URBAN PLANNING AND SocIAL PoLIcY 60 (1968).
Relocation often becomes a major psychological and sociological transition for which
the majority are not prepared. See Fried, Functions of the Working-Class Community
in Modern Urban Society: Implications for Forced Relocation, 33 J. AM. INsrrruTE oF

PLANNERS 90 (1967). Consequently, pioblems may develop when, assuming that they
do find adequate relocation housing, they are faced with the increased pressure of
meeting the demands to accommodate their behavior to a different standard of values and morality. See H. GANS, The Social Implication of Slum Clearance and Relocation, in PEOPLE & PLANS 208 (1968).

28. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
29. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, § 305
(c)(2), 79 Stat. 451.
30. 294 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968) [hereinafter referred to as WACO I].
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the protest was that no adequate relocation plan existed for the Western
Addition A-2 area.31 After receiving no reply, plaintiffs commenced
this action in the federal district court on December 15, 1967, against
the Secretary and the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. On the basis of the plaintiffs' contention "that the 'relocation plan' of the Redevelopment Agency [did]
not in fact meet the requirements of section 1455(c) and the Secretary's
approval of it [had] been arbitrary and without actual [sic] basis
. . ,.32 the court enjoined the Secretary from honoring future financing requests from the LPA and enjoined the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency from proceeding with the enforced displacement
of residents in the project area. 3 In its opinion, the court discussed
the issues raised in any judicial review of an urban renewal project
having allegedly inadequate relocation facilities.
A.

Standing to Sue

The first question that a court must consider is whether the plaintiffs have adequate standing to sue.
Though many actions have been
brought seeking to enjoin urban renewal projects, the majority of these
cases have been based on alleged violations of the fifth amendment.3 5 It
was not until 1962, in the case of Harrison-HalstedCommunity Group,
Inc. v. Housing and Home Finance Agency, 6 that the question of standing to sue under section 105(c) was directly dealt with in a federal
court.

37

In Harrison-Halsted,many businesses and residents self-relocated
in areas adjacent to the new development. This was done primarily in
31. Id. at 437-40. The right of plaintiff displacees to file an administrative
protest with the Dep't of Housing and Urban Development was judicially determined
in the case of Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
32. WACO I at 435.
33. Id. at 440-41.
34. Plaintiffs have standing to sue whenever their interest in the determination
of the case or controversy is direct and substantial. See generally Tondro, Urban Renewal Relocation Problems in Enforcement of Conditions of Federal Grants to Local
Agencies, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 183, 205-214 (1968).
35. Blankenship v. City of Decatur, 269 Ala. 670, 115 So. 2d 459 (1959);
Randolph v. Wilmington Housing Authority, 37 Del. Ch. 202, 139 A.2d 476 (1958);
Bailey v. Housing Authority, 214 Ga. 790, 107 S.E.2d 812 (1959); Adamowski v.
Chicago Land Clearance Comm'n, 14 Il. 2d 74, 150 N.E.2d 792 (1958); Fatzer v.
Urban Renewal Agency, 179 Kan. 435, 296 P.2d 656 (1956).
36. 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962).
37. In Hunter v. New York, 121 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1953), the court declined to rule
on the issue of standing to sue, claiming that even if plaintiffs had standing, they lacked
jurisdiction over the acts of federal officials administering federal laws. Id. at 847-48.
This decision determined the jurisdiction for subsequent actions arising under section
105(c) of the Housing Act of 1949, all of which have been brought in federal courts.
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reliance on the approved redevelopment plan. The plan, however, was
abruptly changed from its proposed development as a residential area
for moderate-income families to a plan for a new campus for the
University of Illinois. The Chicago Land Clearance Commission held
no hearings on the new resolution. After approval of the resolution,
the Planning and Housing Committee of the Chicago City Council
held a public hearing. Objectors were allowed to appear and make
statements but were not allowed to subpoena witnesses, documents, or
cross-examine city and land clearance officials. Subsequently, the State
Housing Board held a hearing on the plan but terminated its proceedings before objectors had an opportunity to present evidence. The
state board then ratified the new proposal and forwarded its findings to
the Housing and Home Finance Agency. Though plaintiffs filed briefs
objecting to the plan, the Housing and Home Finance Agency approved
the project and entered into loan and capital grant contracts.
Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief on the basis of detrimental reliance in self-relocating and on the basis of lack of an adequate relocation plan as required by section 105(c).18 In affirming the dismissal
of the complaint by the district court, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the Housing Act of 1949 was a subsidy statute providing federal grants of aid to local governmental units. As such, the
included provisions and regulations did not confer private legal rights
on anyone not a party to the contract.3" Relying on Frothinghain v.
Mellon,40 the court stated that "it is well settled that in a private suit in a
federal court, where it is claimed that a substantial federal question
is involved, it must clearly appear that defendant's acts constituted the
invasion of plaintiffs' private legal rights."4 1 Since plaintiffs were not
parties to the contract, they had no private legal
rights under the Housing
42
Act of 1949 and therefore no standing to sue.
The Ninth Circuit, in Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Oakland,4 3 delivered a similar holding. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief as
third party beneficiaries, alleging that the redevelopment agency failed
to comply with the requirements of section 105(c). The court rejected this argument finding that it was not the intent of Congress to
grant displacees a cause of action to enforce the regulations of section
105(c). Although plaintiffs might have met the requirements for a
third party beneficiary under California law, the court found that the
contract was a federal contract, and that federal law, which had con38.

See note 11 supra.

39.

310 F.2d at 104.

40.

262 U.S. 447 (1923).

41.
42.
43.

310 F.2d at 103.
Id. at 106.
317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1963).
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sistently denied standing to displaced tenants, was applicable to the
situation.4 4 Furthermore, the court pointed out that federal administrative remedies were available,4 5 and that state statutory provisions"
60 days after the project has been
authorize judicial review within
47
approved by the local authority.
In Green Street Association v. Daley,48 plaintiffs alleged that the
purpose of the urban renewal project was "Negro removal." Plaintiffs
also relied upon deficiencies in the urban renewal project with respect
to the requirements of section 105(c). In dismissing the complaint,
the court stated: "The plaintiffs renewed attack on the Plan in terms
of the Housing Act of 1949 is . . . subject to the rule stated in the
Harrison-Halstedcase . . . . The plaintiffs have no standing to litigate questions arising from alleged violations of the Act."49
In all three of the above cases, the courts failed to realize the importance of adequate housing to the displaced person and the concomitant duty of the court to find a private legal right under the Housing Act
of 1949.r ° This may have been due to the courts' fear that emphasis
44. Id. at 874.
45. The occupants of a site selected for an urban renewal project have the right
to attend a public hearing and voice their objections prior to the acquisition of any of
Though ostensibly an
the land in the project area. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1964).
adequate nonjudicial remedy, in practice it is no remedy at all. Because of their typically lower level of education, the occupants of the slums and blighted areas slated for
See
urban renewal characteristically have a sense of political disenfranchisement.
Statement by Mr. John Hirten, Executive Director of the San Francisco Planning and
Urban Renewal Association (SPUR), in 2 HEARINGS BEFORE THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS 268-69 (1968). As the hearing is held by those interests
who have already decided that the project is necessary, the demands by the site
occupant that the decision be reversed until more adequate relocation facilities are
available are generally futile. The site occupant can petition the Secretary of HUD
to hear evidence that the project should not be granted federal funds; however, the
Secretary is under considerable pressure from the community, which has financially
and politically committed itself to the project. In view of this pressure, it is highly
unlikely that evidence produced by the site resident in opposition to the proposed project will have any affect.
46. The court was referring to Cal. Stat. 1949, c. 1573, § 19, at 2822. This
section provided for a judicial remedy after the initial approval of the project at the
local level. Though this section has been repealed, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 33500 still provides a 60 day statute of limitations for bringing such an action. However, as this remedy is available for only a relatively short period of time, the longer
the delay, the more surely it is to fail.
47. See Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1963).
48. 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967).
49. Id. at 8.
50. "Housing is a necessary." Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921). This
is particularly true for the low-income family and the low-income elderly. They are
already, in most cases, living in inadequate housing and a policy which ignores their
needs, indeed which allows their living conditions to become aggravated by inadequate
relocation provisions, cannot and should not be tolerated.
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on relocation would substantially curtail urban renewal activities, as
indeed it would have in the 1950's,5 1 or due to the courts' reluctance to
either create or discover adequate standards of review.
The first indication of a change in emphasis is found in Norwalk
CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency. 52 Plaintiffs alleged that in
the planning and implementation of the redevelopment project the defendants did not provide equal protection of the law because they failed
to assure or attempt to assure relocation for displaced Negroes and
Puerto Ricans to the same extent they did for whites. The court
granted standing on the basis of plaintiffs' right not to be subjected to
racial discrimination in government programs. 53 The court, however,
also examined the legislative intent behind the recent amendment to
the relocation provisions of the Housing Act of 1949."4 It determined
that the plaintiffs qua displacees had a sufficient interest in relocation
to give them standing.55 The court expressly declined to follow Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Oakland and Green Street Association v. Daley,5 8 and distinguished Harrison-Halstedon the basis that
plaintiffs' economic interest there was not sufficient to support standing.57
The end result of Norwalk CORE was to grant standing to plaintiffs seeking to enjoin urban renewal projects because of deficiencies in
meeting the requirements of section 105(c), as amended, on either of
two grounds: (1) violation of the fourteenth amendment guarantee
of equal protection of the laws; or (2) that the federal legislative intent
was to give the right of judicial review to displaced persons alleging
substantial violations of section 105(c).
It should be noted that in Norwalk CORE the granting of standing
was eased considerably by the court's determination that the action was
justiciable on the basis of whether there was racial discrimination in
the assurances of relocation housing,5" thereby avoiding the issue of
standards of review of administrative compliance with the statute.
WACO I completes the evolutionary trend from a finding of no
standing to sue under the provisions of the Housing Act of 1949 to the
finding that the Housing Act of 1949 confers private legal rights upon
displacees of an urban renewal project. Reviewing the cases and the
legislative history of the Housing Act of 1949, the WACO I court stated
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
Id. at 927.
See note 14 supra.
395 F.2d at 933-34.
Id. at 935.
Id.
Id. at 929.
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that recent amendments to the Act clarified congressional intent. The
court found that Congress, by imposing upon the Secretary the duty of
requiring satisfactory assurance that the LPA's contractual obligations
59
regarding the availability of adequate relocation facilities were met,
00
It
intended to confer private legal rights upon displaced persons.
clearly recognized the right of the displacee to be provided with adequate relocation facilities prior to actual displacement. The decision
relied heavily upon Norwalk CORE and the recent case of Flast v. Cohen,"' in which the United States Supreme Court distinguished
had no
Frothingham v. Mellon and held that the de minimis doctrine
62
concerned.
are
rights
constitutional
specific
where
application
The court in WACO I also relied on Powelton Civic Home Owners
Association v. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 3 The
decision in Powelton, however, was based on a narrow set of facts and
has only limited application to a case such as WACO I. Since the project was still in its initial stages, there were no significant financial commitments that would be jeopardized. HUD was enjoined from disbursing federal funds until plaintiffs were afforded the opportunity to submit evidence bearing on the eligibility of the project to receive federal
funds. If the procedural objection had not been raised until the land
had been acquired and actual clearance had begun, it is questionable
whether the court would have entertained the action solely on this basis.
The holding in Powelton can be narrowly characterized as a mere
recognition of the right to an administrative review. The right of a substantive review was not established; only the procedural implications of
section 1435(c) were ruled upon.
In summary, the early decisions refused to find that section 105(c)
of the Housing Act of 1949 conferred private legal rights upon residents
about to be displaced by an urban renewal project. Subsequent legislation amending section 105(c), however, clarified congressional intent. Moreover, an increasing awareness by the courts of the social
impact of urban renewal as evidenced by the recent intensification of
social unrest in the low-income and minority groups has resulted in a
change in the status of the plaintiff. The court in Powelton explicitly
recognized that the plaintiff had standing to assert the procedural implications of the relocation provisions. Finally, in WACO I the court held
59. WACO I at 443.
60. Id. at 442.
61. 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (allowing taxpayers standing to sue to enjoin expenditures of public funds on parochial schools).
62. 392 U.S. at 104-05. There has been no ruling on whether a single individual may obtain an injunction against an urban renewal project on the basis on
inadequate relocation facilities. The reliance the court in WACO I placed on Flast v.
Cohen suggests that an injunction would be granted.
63. 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
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that section 105(c) of the Housing Act of 1949, as amended, conferred
standing to assert substantive rights granted by the relocation provisions.
WACO I completed the cycle and recognized the plaintiffs' standing
to sue solely on the basis of private legal rights conferred by section
105(c), amended and restated in sections 1455(c)(1) and (2) of
Title 42 of the United States Code.
B. Judicial Review
Acknowledging the standing of the plaintiff to sue, the next question that a court must consider is whether it has judicial power to review
administrative decisions affecting relocation programs.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,
is entitled to judicial review thereof. 0' 4 Nevertheless, judicial review
is not available if the particular statute precludes it, or if, by law, the
agency action is committed to agency discretion.65
An examination of sections 1455(c)(1) and (2) reveals that
neither section implicitly or explicitly precludes judicial review. 66 The
question, however, whether the agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law must be examined.
Since section 1455(c)(1) does not contain any language that
might be interpreted as committing agency action to agency discretion,
this examination must center on section 1455(c)(2). It might be
argued that Congress, by requiring that the LPA's assurances of adequate relocation housing be "satisfactory" to the Secretary, was committing all action prescribed by section 1455(c)(2) to agency discretion. If so construed, any action arising under 1455(c)(2) would not
be subject to judicial review. But this argument involves a misunderstanding of the nature of the agency action established by section 1455
(c)(2). Section 1455(c)(2) establishes that the Secretary "shall require . . satisfactory assurance by the local public agency that decent,
safe, and sanitary dwellings. . . are available for the relocation of each
67
such individual or family.1
There are three aspects of agency action in section 1455(c)(2).
First, the LPA is required to provide the assurances described in the
section; second, the Secretary shall require these assurances. These
actions by their terms are made mandatory by Congress as a condition
64. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. HI, 1968). 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) has been construed
to be a relevant statute within the meaning of this section. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).

65. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (Supp. IH, 1968).
66. See notes 14 & 15 supra.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (2) (Supp. 1II, 1968) (emphasis added).
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to further assistance to each urban renewal project involving the displacement of individuals and families. Third, these assurances must be
satisfactory. Clearly, there is no discretion involved in either the first
or second aspect on the part of the LPA or the Secretary; nor is the LPA
the judge of the satisfactoriness of the assurances; the determination must
be made by the Secretary. The question remains, however, whether
because there is inherent in the nature of satisfactorinessa certain quantum of subjectivity, the use by Congress of "satisfactory" in section
1455(c)(2) constitutes a sufficient legislative commitment of agency
action to agency discretion within the meaning of the Administrative
Procedure Act to preclude judicial review.
The court in WACO I compared the language of this section to
that of section 1465(e),6 8 and relying on the case of Cappadora v.
Celebrezze,69 concluded that the Secretary's determination of satisfactoriness was subject to judicial review, as least 70to the extent of ensuring that his determination had not been arbitrary.
C. Standards of Review
Once a court has concluded that it has judicial power to review an
administrative decision affecting relocation programs, it is faced with
the additional problem of creating or discovering criteria by which to
evaluate that decision.
In Norwalk CORE the court stated that in determining whether
there has been compliance with the requirements of section 105(c),
"courts will evaluate agency efforts and success at relocation with a
realistic awareness of the problems facing urban renewal programs.
Objections by individual displacees based on too literal an interpretation of the Act's standards could unnecessarily interfere with programs
of benefit to the entire community."'" Though clearly sympathetic to
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1465(e) (Supp. III, 1968): "[D]eterminations of any duly
designated officer or agency as to eligibility for and the amount of relocation assistance
. . . shall be final and conclusive for any purposes and not subject to redetermination
by any court or any other officer."
69. 356 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966). The holding of Cappadora was that the discretionary refusal of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to reconsider a denial of benefits was reviewable under the APA. This holding was recently followed
in another Social Security action, Pasquale v. Cohen, 296 F. Supp. 1088, 1093
(D.R.I. 1969). This holding has been applied in other areas: Norwalk CORE v.
Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 932 (2d Cir. 1968) (urban renewal action);
Szostak v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 370 F.2d 253, 254 (2d Cir. 1966) (retirement
claim); Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. Department of Housing and Urban Dev.,
284 F. Supp. 809, 820 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (urban renewal action); Road Review League
v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (highway location).
70. WACO I at 443.
71. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 937 (2d Cir.
1968).
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the urban renewal program, the court nevertheless found that a review
of the adequacy of the relocation program on its merits was necessary.
As previously mentioned, however, the court had already defined the
justiciable issue to be whether or not racial discrimination existed in
assuring adequate relocation facilities, thus avoiding the issue of standards of review of nonconstitutional questions. 2
In WACO I, while denying that it is the function of the court to
administer the complexities of urban redevelopment, Judge Sweigert
stated that "the court can and should see to it that the Secretary complies
with the requirements of the federal statute and his own regulations,
not merely in form but in substance, and that the administrative discretion vested in him by law is not arbitrarily abused. . . but is reasonably exercised with some substantial basis in fact to support it."' 73 The
court specifically stated that it was under a duty to ensure that the
Secretary's discretion in determining the satisfactoriness of the LPA's
assurances had not been arbitrarily abused. 74 The court's interpretation
of the facts, however, prevented it from performing this self-imposed
duty.
Reviewing the HUD evaluation of the relocation program contained
in a letter of July 29, 1968, 75 the court in WACO I found that
while the letter was ostensibly a finding of satisfactoriness, it was in
actuality an expression of unsatisfactoriness. 76 The court based this
finding partly on the fact that the Regional Director's determination of
satisfactoriness was made entirely contingent upon future accomplishments and events.17 Because the relocation plan depended in part upon
72. See text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
73. WACO I at 441 (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. This letter was from Robert Pitts, Regional Administrator of HUD in San
Francisco, acting on behalf of the Secretary, to the San Francisco Redevelopment
Agency. WACO I at 437.
76. WACO I at 437-38.
77. The letter stated that the relocation plan submitted by the LPA was acceptable and satisfactory. However, the Redevelopment Agency was prohibited from proceeding with relocation until four contingencies were either met, or that other resources meeting the requirements of section 1455(c) were satisfactorily demonstrated to
be available. These four contingencies were:
"I. Availability and utilization of relocation aids under the pending Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1968 and related appropriation bills;
"2. Adoption by the Board of Supervisors of a resolution or resolutions, satisfactory to the Regional Administrator, specifying the purposes for which money previously appropriated ($300,000) shall be expended, including amounts for rent supplements, and the organizational unit or units having control of such appropriations and
expenditures;
"3. The further implementation of 221(d)(3) housing in Western Addition
A-2 and the other two projects in accordance with the statements set forth in my letter
to you of July 19, 1968; and
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those contingencies, the Regional Director's determination was in
fact unsatisfactory. As a result, the requirements of the contractual
provisions of sections 1455(c)(1) and (2) had not been met and a
preliminary injunction was appropriate relief."'
The Secretary's determination, as the court properly concluded
from its review of the record, was a determination of unsatisfactoriness.
Consequently, there was no discretionary determination of satisfactoriness to provide the basis for a judicial review of arbitrariness.
To meet the contractual obligations under section 1455(c), the Secretary or his designated representative must first make a determination
of satisfactoriness. At that time, in order to dissolve the preliminary
injunction, it becomes incumbent upon the court to assume the duty that
it so definitely and distinctly expounded: Review the Secretary's determination of satisfactorinessto ensure that it is not arbitrary, but is reasonably exercised upon a substantial basis of fact. Yet here lies the
difficulty: To review the Secretary's determination of satisfactoriness,
the court must first determine just what constitutes a reasonably factual
basis.
To illustrate the court's dilemma, the nature and terms of the
preliminary injunction must be examined.
D. The Preliminary Injunction
The court in WACO I enjoined the defendant, San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, from proceeding with the enforced displacement of
residents of the project area "unless and until the local agency has submitted to the Secretary a relocation plan, satisfactory to the Secretary and
approved by this court. . . ."" The court further stated that "[t]o the
extent that relocation of families or individuals is dependent upon the
contingencies . . . already set forth, and such contingencies have not
been accomplished sufficiently . . . the local agency shall not proceed
with the displacement."8' 0
The court stated that the relocation plan must be "satisfactory to
the Secretary and approved by this court." This may be interpreted in
several ways. One, the court may have simply meant that the new
"4. Appropriate and satisfactory phasing of relocation activities in an orderly and
progressive manner so that site occupants, to the extent feasible, may be relocated
within the project area with a minimum of hardship, and that such phasing be over
such period of time (presently estimated to be approximately five years) as may be
needed for provision of the required housing." WACO I at 437-38.
78. HUD continued to supply federal funds to the project even though the contractual obligations had not been met by the LPA. This fact obstructs any clear understanding of the holding.
79. WACO I at 440 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 441 (emphasis added).
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plan must be acceptable to the Secretary, the phrase "and approved by
the court" being excess verbiage. In this event, upon the Secretary's
statement of satisfactoriness, the court would summarily dissolve the
injunction without any review. Two, the court may have meant that
the new plan must be satisfactory to the Secretary and also approved by
the court through an independent examination of the plan; yet, this would
necessarily involve the court in the administrative complexities that it
clearly stated it would abstain from. 81 Three, the court may have meant
that the new plan must be satisfactory to the Secretary, and that the
Secretary's determination of satisfactoriness must, upon review by the
court, be found to be based upon such reasonably substantial facts
as would merit court approval. The third suggestion is the only interpretation consistent with the stated holding of the court that "the court
can and should see to it that the . . . discretion vested in [the Secretary] . . . is not arbitrarily abused . . . but 8 is
reasonably exercised
2
with some substantial basis of fact to support it."
The court enjoined the Secretary from honoring future requisitions
from the LPA for federal financing
until and unless, upon further application to this court, he can
show that the relocation plan of the local agency is in fact satisfactory . . . to the extent, at least, that it assures reasonable and
present availability of decent, safe and sanitary housing, within the
meaning of Section 1455(c)(1) and (2) for any individuals or
families about to be displaced
83 by condemnation, eviction or threats
of condemnation or eviction.
The court therefore conditioned a dissolution of the preliminary injunction against the Secretary not merely upon a determination of satisfactoriness by the Secretary, but upon the Secretary's demonstration
that the plan is in fact satisfactory.
The distinction noted above between a plan which is satisfactory
and one which is in fact satisfactory is subject to the same interpretation
as the condition stated by the court in dissolving the preliminary injunction against the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency. 4 Further,
the court not only required that the relocation plan assure adequate
relocation facilities for those individuals and families that officially enter
the relocation workload,85 but also prohibited any action that might be
81. Id.
82. id.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. The three possible interpretations are: One, there is no difference and the
court will accept the determination of the Secretary at its face value; two, the court
will use independently arrived at data to decide whether or not the plan is in fact satisfactory; and three, the court will review the determination of the Secretary upon its
merits to ensure it is not arbitrary. See text accompanying notes 81-83 supra.
85. HANDBOOK RHA 7212.1, ch. 3, sec. 1, at 1, states that a site occupant (a
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interpreted by the individuals and families concerned as threats of condemnation or eviction.8
The concern of the court for the rights of the displaced persons is
reflected in the terms of the injunction. Dissolution was based not
merely upon accomplishment of the contingencies," but upon sufficient
accomplishment of them. 8 Without this relief, the individuals and
families in the area "would remain uncertain and insecure. . . and may
well conclude that they must leave the area notwithstanding the absence
of reasonably available relocation housing within the meaning of section 1455(c)(1)." ' 9
The concern of the court for the rights of the plaintiffs was further
reinforced by the scope of the relocation plan. The court required availability of adequate relocation housing for the existent population of the
project area subject to displacement. By requiring the relocation plan
to include provisions for those individuals and families about to be displaced by threats of condemnation or eviction,9 0 the court implicitly
condemned any unofficial action designed to panic the residents into
self-relocation, with a consequently reduced relocation workload. A
thorough judicial review of the Secretary's determination was the only
way in which the court could ensure protection of the rights of the displaced.
To sum up, the court in WACO I took a giant step forward in the
protection of the rights of the individuals and families living in areas
family, individual, or business concern occupying property in the area) "enters the relocation workload when any of the following occurs:
1. The property occupied is acquired by the LPA or other public body.
2. A landlord requests assistance in relocating a tenant to permit rehabilitation
or code enforcement.
3. A code enforcement agency requests assistance in vacating a unit.
4. A site occupant requests assistance as a result of rehabilitation or code enforcement" (emphasis added).
86. It is not uncommon for unofficial administrative actions to be interpreted
by the site occupants as threats of condemnation or eviction. Many of the site occupants are thereby panicked into self-relocation. When this occurs, the housing into
which the site occupant self-relocates is not regulated by the requirements of section
1455(c). Those site occupants who self-relocate do not enter the relocation workload
of the LPA; see note 86 supra. Consequently, statistics reflect a smaller quantity of
relocation facilities than is actually the case.
When a relocation program is obviously inadequate, it is possible for a LPA to purposefully intensify the panic leading to self-relocation. This decreases the number of
individuals and families for which the LPA must provide adequate relocation facilities
and consequently allows the LPA to more easily achieve the requirements of section

1455(c). See Statement by Joel August, 2
286 (1968).

URBAN PROBLEMS

87.
88.
89.
90.

See note 77 supra.
WACO I at 441.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.

HEARINGS BEFORE THE NATONAL COMM'N ON
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scheduled for urban renewal projects. It not only unqualifiedly recognized that section 105(c) of the Housing Act of 1949 confers private
legal rights upon those individuals and families, but that the Secretary's
determination of the satisfactoriness of the LPA's assurance of adequate relocation facilities is subject to judicial review for arbitrariness.
The court, however, left itself in limbo regarding the criteria it would
use to determine what constitutes a reasonably substantial factual basis
for the Secretary's determination. To see how the court resolved this
dilemma, its subsequent action must be reviewed.
IH. Western Addition Community Organization v. Romney

(WACO H)
In WACO I, the court granted a preliminary injunction and established the criteria for dissolution of that injunction. On March 5, 1969,
an unpublished memorandum decision on the defendant's motion to
dissolve the preliminary injunction was filed. 91 The new Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development, George Romney, was substituted for
Robert Weaver, and the action was again presided over by District Judge
Sweigert.
In WACO II, the court, in a brief review of its prior decision, stated
that it had had "no other course but to hold that the Secretary was not
proceeding in compliance with the Housing Act and that further financing of the project would be enjoined until he brought himself into
compliance." 2
In WACO II, the court ruled favorably on the motion of the Secretary to dissolve the preliminary injunction on the basis that "as of January 29, 1969, he [had] made an unqualified and unconditional determination that the local agency's relocation plan and its assurances of
available relocation housing for displacees [were] now satisfactory
. . . .,0 The Secretary's determination of satisfactoriness was based
on his decision that the four contingencies discussed in WACO I no
longer existed. 94
91. Memorandum of Decision on Defendant's Motion To Dissolve Preliminary
Injunction, Western Addition Community Organization v. Romney, Civil No. 49,053
(N.D. Cal., filed March 5, 1969) [hereinafter cited as WACO II].
92. Id. at 3.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 4-7. In substance and effect, the findings upon which the determination of satisfactoriness is made are:
"[(a)] with respect to the first condition, availability and utilization of new federal relocation aids, that the Housing and Urban Redevelopment Act of 1968 was enacted as Public Law 90-448, 90th Congress, S. 3497 . . . [and] that the new law
contains many provisions designed to promote new and rehabilitated housing, particularly for low and moderate income families; . . . that the local agency is presently
utilizing some of the provisions of the new law and proposed to utilize others, and
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In dissolving the injunction the court noted the plaintiffs' disagreement with the Secretary's determination of satisfactoriness, 5 but stated
this "merely [indicated] that the record [was] such as to be subject
to different inferences and [was], therefore, controversial." 90 1 The
court further noted that section 1455 (c) (2) does not "make continuance of federal assistance dependent upon the existence in fact of
available relocation housing. Rather, the requirement is merely that
the Secretary, exercising his sound discretion and presumed expertise,
be 'satisfied' with the local agency's 'assurances' in that respect."9 "
Relying on the 1936 Ohio case of Sidle v. Baker, 8 the court pointed out
that "assurance" does not mean an absolute certainty of the factual
situation in question. Rather, the term means that the subject matter,
considering the appearances, reasonably seems to be sure, although it
could conceivably be found not to be so. 99
The court in WACO II held that upon the record before it and
the Secretary's unqualified, unconditional expression of satisfactoriness
such actual and proposed utilization is satisfactory.
"(b) with respect to the second condition, action by the Board of Supervisors ...
[adopting] Resolution No. 353-68, declaring its policy to appropriate certain ...
revenues for use in relocating [displaced] persons . . . [and adopting] Resolution No.
581-68, specifying the purposes for which money previously appropriated ($300,00)
would be expended . . . taken together, are deemed satisfactory for the purpose of
. . . providing an acceptable program of local rest supplements for an initial period of
eighteen months.
"(c) with respect to the third condition, further implementation of FHA Section
221(d)(3) housing in accordance with letter of July 19, 1968 . . . it is contemplated
that the new Section 236 interest reduction payment program . . . will ultimately
supplant the FHA Section 221(d)(3) . . . and, therefore, future construction ...
will be under the 236 program . . . ; that there are two 221 (d)(3) projects . . . under
construction . . . and there is presently pending before HUD applications for four Section 236 projects which will provide . . . housing in the project . . . ; that the local
agency represents that applications will be filed in the near future . . . and long range,
. . . an additional 16 sites for 1673 units will be made available to sponsors ....
"(d) with respect to the fourth condition, appropriate and satisfactory phasing of
relocation, that the local agency carries on its relocation activities in conjunction with
other development activities in three phases, according to land area rather than by time
periods; that data supplied by the local agency indicated that in Phase I 941 individuals
and families are to be displaced, and there exist or are being provided for them 1776
dwelling units; that in Phase II 1073 individuals and families are to be displaced, and
there exist or are being provided for them 2727 dwelling units; that in Phase III 1989
individuals and families are to be displaced, and there exist or are being provided for
them 5087 dwelling units; that the local agency's reliance upon vacancies in existing
dwellings to satisfy relocation needs is acceptable and that the phasing program . . .
is satisfactory . . ." Id. at 4-7. (emphasis added).
The original contingencies are
set out in note 77 supra.
95. WACO II at 7.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 52 Ohio App. 89, 3 N.E.2d 537 (1936).
99. WACO II at 8.
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with the relocation plan and assurances of available relocation housing,
it could not find that the Secretary's decision was "wholly arbitrary,
irresponsible and without factual basis."'10 Since the preliminary injunction "expressly provided that it would remain in effect only 'until
the Secretary could show that the plan for relocation of said residents
[was] in fact satisfactory .
"101 and since the action was at the
preliminary injunction stage, the court weighed the possibility of some
individual hardship against the public interest that would be served by
completion of the project. In dissolving the injunction, the court stated:
Because of the changed posture of the case, resulting from the
January 29, 1969 unqualified statement of approval and satisfaction of the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, the
court concludes that
the preliminary injunction should be and is
10 2
hereby dissolved.
*...'

A. Criteria for Dissolving the Injunction
The result of the hearing on the defendant's motion to dissolve the
preliminary injunction is clear. However, it is necessary to examine this
result in terms of the court's criteria for dissolution as set forth in
WACO I to see whetherthe court maintained consistency in its holdings.
In view of the criteria for dissolution discussed above, 1°3 several alternative methods of judicial review were available to the court.
1.

Face Value Acceptance of the Secretary'sDetermination

Although not strictly a method of judicial review, the court
could have accepted the Secretary's determination of satisfactoriness at
face value. Such an acceptance, however, completely ignores the court's
earlier self-imposed duty to review the Secretary's determination to ensure a reasonably substantial factual basis. Assuming that the court
chose this alternative, the decision in WACO Ii was predetermined.
As soon as the Secretary made a finding of satisfactoriness, the court
would automatically dissolve the injunction. But this would be totally
irreconcilable with the holding of WACO I that the court can and
04
should ensure that the Secretary does not abuse his discretion.
2.

Quasi-SubstantiveReview

The court could have reviewed the Secretary's determination to ensure that it was not arbitrary. But this necessarily presupposes the
existence of some standard of review. One possibility, a quasi-sub100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 10-11.
See text accompanying notes 79-83 supra.
See text accompanying note 73 supra.

452
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stantive approach, would be to compare the new evidence with the
record before the court in WACO I. The court could then examine the
evidence to see if there were any apparent inconsistencies and whether
new evidence satisfied the deficiencies that caused the original relocation
plan to be rejected as unsatisfactory. Though a possible, and perhaps
adequate means of judicial review in this instance, it cannot be squared
with the court's requirement in WACO I that the Secretary show that
the relocation plan "is in fact satisfactory. . . to the extent, at least, that
it assures reasonable and present availability of decent, safe and sanitary
housing . . . ."5 Nevertheless, in view of the court's reliance on
Sidle v. Baker,10 this may well be what the court attempted to do.
Assuming this was the approach of the court in WACO I1, difficulties
are immediately encountered.
In WACO I, the court determined that the relocation plan was unsatisfactory. This determination was made upon the record before the
court, including the letter of July 29, 1968. The court stated that to the
extent relocation of families or individuals was dependent upon the
accomplishment0 7 of the four contingencies, the relocation program was
unsatisfactory.1
The program was unsatisfactory not only because it was contingent
on future events, but because several other unsatisfactory areas were
indicated. First, as far back as August 29, 1967, the Regional Director
was advised:
Since the timing on the availability of these newly constructed or
rehabilitated units is an important factor and, at this time, we are
unable to fix a date, the relocation period may have to be extended
beyond five years and definite phasing scheduled. 0 8
Second, a memorandum from the Relocation Branch Director to the
Assistant Regional Administrator dated August 21, 1967, concluded that
[i]t should be noted that the entire relocation plan is based on
turnover with the exception of 200 units of new public housing
which will not be available. Despite the discrepancies . . . regarding the supply available, and the questionable technique of estimating the availability of hotel rooms, there is still a deficiency
as acknowledged by the LPA.10
Third, in support of a rejection of a request for permission to waive
contract provisions and use project funds for rental deposits, the Assistant Secretary stated in a memorandum dated March 7, 1968, that
there is a serious shortage of low and moderate cost housing in
105.
106.
supra.
107.
108.
109.

WACO I at 441.
52 Ohio App. 89, 3 N.E.2d 537 (1936).
WACO I at 441.
Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
Id. at 439 (emphasis added).

See text accompanying note 98
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San Francisco. We do not believe that Federal funds should be
expended to permit the San Francisco LPA to capture available
units and hold them for those it displaces, without regard to other
demand, in a housing market in which there are virtually no
vacancies. .

.

. The Department is presently preparing implemen-

tation of a policy which will state that no community with less than a
three per cent vacancy rate will be permitted to rely upon the
existing housing supply for relocation resources. It is less than
three per cent. The shortage of housing resources, coupled with
the magnitude of displacement occurring by reason of the execution of several urban renewal and code enforcement projects in the
city, makes us seriously question the wisdom of using Federal funds
in this manner. 10
What new information was available to the court in WACO II
that indicated that these deficiencies had been corrected? The only new
information was the response of the LPA to the contingencies noted in
WACO 1.111 An examination of this response, however, reveals that
the original contingencies had not been met.
To satisfy the original contingencies, the LPA relied heavily on
the fact that the Housing and Urban Redevelopment Act of 1968112 was
enacted. This furnished many provisions designed to alleviate the problem of relocation housing. The LPA proposed to use some of these
provisions, and stated that it was utilizing others."' Nonetheless, the.
court in WACO I did not require that token action be taken; it demanded that the contingencies be sufficiently satisfied." 4 In solving
the problem of inadequate relocation facilities, utilization of the new provisions would not necessarily be sufficient to effect a solution.
Though resolutions were adopted authorizing appropriations for
rent supplements-for an initial period of 18 months,":5 HUD previously
stressed that the relocation program might have to be extended beyond
five years."" The period of appropriations was patently inadequate in
view of the sufficiency requirement laid down by the court in WACO
1.117

The remaining information that allegedly satisfied the original
contingencies was laden with speculation and new contingencies.
Phrases such as "it is contemplated," "will ultimately," "presently pending," "will be filed" and "will be made available" permeated the new
material. 118 In brief, the original contingencies had merely been re110.

Id. (emphasis added).

111.

See note 94 supra.

112.

Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 524.

113. See note-94 supra at (a).
114. WACO I at 441.
115. See note 94 supra at (b).
116. WACO I at 438; see text accompanying note 108 supra.
117. Id. at 441. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
118. See note 94 supra.
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placed by new ones. The actions that were taken were either inadequate or not capable of being evaluated according to the sufficiency of
relief provided.
Finally, the LPA's response assured the Secretary that adequate
relocation housing was available to meet the needs of its relocation phasing program." 9 But the new information, which stated that adequate
housing either existed or was being provided, failed to show the source
of the new housing. It is difficult to understand the Secretary's determination that "the local agency's reliance upon vacancies in existing
dwellings to satisfy relocation needs is acceptable .
"...
1o Less than
a year before, the Department's position was that there was a serious
shortage of low- and moderate-cost housing in San Francisco and that
there were virtually no vacancies in the housing market. 2 ' The relocation program had been described as based "on turnover with the
exception of 200 units of new public housing which will not be available .. . .""I' Furthermore, even though the questionable technique
of estimating the availability of hotel rooms was used, the LPA, in 23any
event, acknowledged a deficiency in available relocation housing.
With this information confronting the court, it is difficult to see,
assuming it used the quasi-substantive method of review, how the
court in WACO II could have determined that there were no significant
inconsistencies in the evidence and that the former discrepancies had
been adequately resolved.
3.

Independent Standards of Review

The court could have reviewed the Secretary's determination for
arbitrariness by establishing independent standards by which the adequacy and accuracy of the Secretary's findings could be measured. As
previously noted, this method of review would require the court to enter
into the administrative complexities of the urban renewal program to an
undetermined degree.' 2 4 In any case, it is doubtful that the court
could surpass the expertise of HUD in analyzing the requirements of a
relocation program and selecting standards to ensure its adequacy.
An examination of the court's opinion in WACO II shows there
was no evidence that the court either established or used any such independent criteria. If it did, the court failed to indicate any conclusions
it might have made that were sufficient to overcome the apparent
inconsistencies and inadequacies already noted in the Secretary's deter119.
120.

Id. at (d).
Id.

121.
122.

WACO I at 439; see text accompany note 110 supra.
WACO I at 439.

123.
124.

Id.
See text accompanying note 81 supra.
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uination of satisfactoriness.125
B. Rights of the Plaintiffs
The interpretation of and emphasis on the rights conferred upon
plaintiffs by section 1455(c),by the court in the two WACO decisions
must also be compared. In VACO I, the court stated that the low- or
moderate-income plaintiff needed the protection of the court. Without
injunctive relief, he would remain uncertain and insecure in his residence
within the project. Being under the impression that his displacement
from his present residence could be legally enforced, he could well conclude that he must leave the area, notwithstanding the absence of reasonably available relocation housing within the meaning of section 1455
(c). 126 The implication of the court was clear: A resident could not be
legally required to move unless adequate relocation facilities did in fact
exist. Further, the court stated that at that time,
individuals and families in the area [did] not have any assurance
of such protection and [were] left for all practical purposes to the
pleasure of the local agency and of the federal financing agency as
be involunto when, how and under what conditions they [could] 27
tarily displaced or threatened with such displacement.'
The court certainly implied that the private legal rights of the plaintiffs
were no less important than the interest of the public in the completion
of the project.
On the other hand, in WACO II the court stated that the public
interest in the completion of the project outweighed any individual relocation hardship that might occur due to a possible administrative error
in judgment. 128 In addition to reversing its former stand that plaintiffs
could not legally be required to move unless adequate relocation facilities
in fact existed, 29 it justified its new position on the basis of the very
issue that it was to determine; that is, it stated that if the Secretary's
determination appeared to be reasonable and not arbitrary, then the
fact that individual plaintiffs were in fact displaced without the assurance
of reasonably available relocation housing was not a basis for injunctive
relief. 130 This holding not only assumed the Secretary's determination
was not arbitrary, 13 but it seriously weakened the court's own previous
recognition in WACO I of the scope of the private rights conferred upon
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See text accompanying notes 103-23 supra.
See WACO I at 441.
Id.
WACO II at 10.
See WACO I at 441.
WACO H- at 8.
For a discussion of whether or not the Secretary's determination could

reasonably be found by the court to be not arbitrary, see text accompanying notes
103-123 supra.
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1455(c). 13 2

the plaintiffs by section
It must be concluded that the decisions of the court in WACO I
and WACO II are irreconcilable both as to the criteria for dissolution of
the injunction and as to the attitude of the court toward the private
legal rights conferred upon the plaintiffs by section 1455(c).
IV. Conclusion
The standing to sue of the plaintiff on a cause of action arising out
of section 1455(c) and the ability of the court to review the administrative action giving rise to that cause of action are now well recognized.
The adequacy of the judicial review of that action as presented by the
incompatible WACO decisions is questionable. Nevertheless, the irreconcilability of the WACO decisions is not the problem. The problem
is the reasoning that underlies the court's inconsistency. It is submitted that a combination of factors may explain the difference: the
lack of any well-defined standard of review, the substantial degree of
execution of the project representing a large financial investment, and
the political and social pressures from the community.
The advances made by the court in WACO I are commendable
and clearly provide the displaced person with a means to ensure his
right to be provided adequate relocation housing within the meaning of
section 1455(c)(1). Not having an easily defined justiciable issue at
hand,1 33 however, the court seemed to flounder and, in WACO II,
retreated from its previous position. The court appears to have accepted
at face value the determination of the Secretary, ignoring the implications
of its previous decision.
The court should review the Secretary's determination of the satisfactoriness of a relocation program to ensure that it has not been arbitrary. This is especially true when, as in WACO I, it is clear that the
requirements of section 1455(c) have not been met. This not only prevents an increase in social tensions and unrest, but also ensures that the
individuals and families about to be displaced are afforded the protection of section 1455(c).
The means by which the court should accomplish this review are
not clear; however, until the court is able to establish standards which
are easily defined and applied, it is suggested that the "quasi-substantive" method be used. This method allows the court to examine the
record before it for inconsistencies and inadequacies without the necessity of becoming embroiled in the actual administration of the urban
renewal program. By using HUD's own carefully established criteria,
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See WACO I at 441.
See, e.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d

Cir. 1968); see text accompanying notes, 52-58 supra.

January 1970]

WACO V WEAVER

457

the court can review the agency's action for arbitrariness and provide
plaintiffs with an effective forum to enforce their rights under section
1455(c).
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